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FIRM R&D GAMES WITH DIFFERING MANUFACTURING COSTS 
Jannett Highfill, B radley University 
Michael McAsey, Bradley University 
The paper considers an industry where competition is characterized as a two-stage game between the two firms in which 
the product reliabilities are determined before the (Coumot) quantities. Reliability is determined by R&D expenditure. 
The focus is on how competitive conditions in terms of manufacturing costs affect tlte firms' decision about optimal 
reliability. The main result of the paper is that the firm with lower manufacturing cost produces a more reliable product. 
However a reduction in a given firm 's manufacturillg cost only causes it to produce a more reliable product when the 
diff erence in costs between finns is low. Comparative static exercises suggest that reliability generally increases when 
customers have a higher reservation price for the product and a lower customer cost of product f ailure. 
Research and development strategies are key to 
profitability for many firms. While R&D expenditures can 
affect the firm in many ways, the present paper focuses on 
the situation when R&D spending is used to increase the 
reliability of a firm' s product. Consider an industry where 
competition is characterized as a two-stage game between 
the two firms in which the product reliabilities are 
determined before the (Cournot) quantities. Reliability is 
determined by R&D expenditure. The focus of the present 
paper is on how competitive conditions (in terms of 
manufacturing costs) affect the firms' decision about optimal 
reliability. 
The paper is theoretical, the model having many formal 
similarities with the R&D/quality literature where quality is 
chosen first and then quantities are chosen in a Cournot-type 
game; see Neary and Leahy (2000), Jinji and Toshirnitsu 
(2006), DeCourcy (2005), Haaland and Kind (2008, 2006), 
and Gretz, Highfill, and Scott (2009). These papers differ 
from the present paper in that their focus is on whether R&D 
should be subsidized rather than on the product quality 
(reliability) itself as the present paper does. With the 
exception of DeCourcy (2005), all of these papers essentially 
argue that R&D should be subsidized either because firms' 
decision making ignores aspects of social surplus like 
consumer surplus, (Jinji and Tosbimitsu (2006), Haaland and 
Kind (2008, 2006), and Gretz, Highfill, and Scott (2009)) or 
intra-firm spillovers (Neary and Leahy (2000)). DeCourcy 
(2005), on the other hand, argues that allowing research 
cooperation between competing firms is superior to any 
subsidy policy. 
The present paper draws particularly on Highfill and 
McAsey (2010) except that while the present paper neglects 
its dynamic considerations, reliabilities are endogenous for 
both firms as they were not in that paper. The present paper 
relies on numerical analysis of the theoretical model. 
The main result of the paper is that the firm with lower 
manufacturing cost produces a more reliable product. 
However this only holds when the difference in costs 
between firms is small. Comparative static exercises suggest 
that reliability generally increases when customers have a 
higher reservation price for the product and a lower 
84 
customer cost of product failure. (The exception is noted 
below.) 
THE MODEL 
Suppose there is a distribution of customer reservation 
prices for a perfect product where the reservation price is the 
highest price a potential customer is willing to pay for a 
perfect product. Reservation prices are assumed to be 
uniformly distributed on the interval (W, V) . That is, w is 
the minimum reservation price for the product and is the 
maximum reservation price. Customers are indifferent 
between the products of the two firms when products are 
perfectly reliable (in which case the two firms will charge 
the same price). These distributional demand assumptions 
are similar to Herguera and Lutz (2003) and Gretz, Highfill, 
and Scott (2009); Haaland and Kind (2008, 2006) arrive at a 
similar (linear) derived demand function by assuming a 
quadratic utility function, while DeCourcy (2005), 
d' Aspremont and Jacquemin (I 988), Brod and Shivakumar 
(1997), and Greenlee (2005) forthrightly assume linear 
demand with no income effects. For the ease of readers the 
present paper reviews the model setup of Highfill and 
McAsey (2010) with the exceptions noted above. 
Our measure of product reliability is the probability 
that a product is judged by the customer to be of acceptable 
quality; this probability is denoted R, for firms i = 1, 2 . This 
notion of quality as product reliability (or the related concept 
of product failure) can be found in Daughety and Reinganum 
(1995), Gretz, Highfill, and Scotl (2009), and Matthews and 
Moore (1987). Product failure imposes costs on the 
customer that are not reimbursed by the finn. This "cost to 
customers" of product failure is the parameter K , so the 
"expected cost of product failure" for a customer purchasing 
from the i 1h firm is (1- R.)K since (1- R
1
) is the probability 
of product failure . Customers know the probability that any 
arbitrary unit will fail, but not whether the particular unit 
they purchase will fail. Customers whose reservation price 
v satisfies the following condition will purchase the 
product: 
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v~~+(l-~)K =~ +(1-R.z)K (1) 
where ~ is the purchase price of the product from firmi. 
Customers are risk neutral in the sense that their buying 
decisions arc based on price and expected customer cost of 
product failuie. The expression P, +(I - R,)K is conveniently 
called the "full quality price." While in general the firms' 
costs, qualities, and prices are not the same, for both firms to 
have positive sales it must be the case that the full quality 
price is the same for both firms. If this were not the case, 
customers would only buy from the fum with the lower full 
quality price. These assumptions imply linear demand 
functions N for the product 
~ = V-(1-RJK- v~w (Ql+Qz) (2) 
where N is the potential market size and Q, is the quantity 
demanded of firm i's product. 
Improvements in quality require research and 
development; the expenditure on R&D is E, ~ 0 for firm L 
Assume that such expenditure produces an improvement in 
the reliability of the firm's product, but is subject to 
diminishing marginal returns. Specifically, 
E, = k(R, - R,0 )
2 (3) 
wherek > 0, and defining o :SR,o :SJ as the "default 
reliabi!jty" that wou1d occur in the absence of any R&D 
expenditure. The assumption of a quadratic relationship 
between quality improvement and R&D spending which is 
independent of the quantity produced is found in Brod and 
Shivakumar ( 1997), d • Aspremont and Jacquemin ( 198 8), 
Greenlee (2005), Herguera and Lutz (2003), Haaland and 
Kind (2006, 2008) and Gretz, Highfill, and Scott (2009). 
Recall that R is a probability and so is between zero and 
I 
one, while the expenditure on R&D is typically rather large 
and certainly never less than one. Therefore the constant k 
needs to reduce R&D expenditures by several orders of 
magnitude and is typically a large number. Finally, although 
for the sake of simplicity we refer to E, as R&D 
expenditure, it is really the component of expenditure which 
varies with reliability. There would normally be many 
fixed-cost R&D expenditures. 
In addition to R&D costs, each firm has a per unit 
manufacturing cost of111c. lt is assumed that the units of the 
' 
product that fail are returned by lhc customer and replaced 
(or if repaired that the repair cost is the same as the 
replacement cost). Thus defining 
c, = me,+ (1- R;)me, (4) 
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the total manufacturing costs arc e,Q, because the 
manufacturing cost of the original units is me, Q,; the 
(expected) cost of replacing or repairing the defective units 
is(l-R.)me,Q,, where (1- R,)Q, is the expected number of 
defective units. 
Firm profits can now be defined as 
n , =(F:-e,)Q,-E, (5) 
recalling equations (2)-(4). The fums play a two-stage game 
where the product reliabilities are determined before the 
(Coumot) quantities. Solutions are computed using 
generalized bacl-ward induction. Therefore, the quantity 
decisions are computed by solving the first order conditions 
(an, 1 aQ, = O). The results are substituted back into the 
objective function and the reliabilities found by solving the 
first order conditions (an, 1 oR, = O). The parameter values 
for the numerical results that follow are 
v =200, W=100, K =100, IJG = 100, and k=l50.cxx:l· 
Thinking about the demand curve first, notice that with 
these parameters the range of reservation prices is 100, the 
range being moved up the axis so that the minimum 
reservation price is not zero. There is nothing special about 
the choice of 100, we just wanted the same order of 
magnitude for all parameters, except for k which as 
mentioned above needs to be orders of magnitude 
larger. This exact value of k was chosen so that the 
reliabilities seem reasonable; that is, in the range between 
90% and 100%. The focus of this paper is on manufacturing 
costs and so the graphs reported in the next section serve as 
a kind a sensitivity analysis for dillering relationships 
between the manufacturing costs o f the two firms. See the 
discussion below. Although not reported here for brevity, 
we have done the same analysis fo r 111~ = 90 and 
111e1 =110 getting results substantially similar to Figures 1-4. 
TH E RELATIONSHIP OF RELIABILIT Y TO 
MANUFACTURING COST ADVANTAGE 
The focus of the present paper is on differences in 
marginal costs between firms. Suppose now that the 
marginal cost for firm 1 is simply me; =100 . Define 
.a! . !5. margm cost rauo= = Pw-· 
me1 
That is, firm 2's costs are greater than firm 1 's if and only if 
the "marginal cost ratio'' PIK: > l· The relationship between 
the marginal cost ratio parameter and firm reliabilities is 
shown in Figure 1. 
FIGURE! 
Reliabilities as a F unction of the Marginal Cost Ratio 
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FIGURE ! 
Reliabilities as a Function of the Marginal Cost Ratio 
Reliability 
1.00 
Firm 2 has 
manufacturing 
cost advantage 




0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 
To interpret Figure I, note that the solution of the firm's 
game is a function of PMc . The manufacturing costs for firm 
1 arc held constant the manufacturing costs for firm 2 vary. 
Figure 1 and all the figures to follow essentially report 
comparative static results. When, for example, p
11
c = .5 , 
firm 2 bas the manufacturing cost advantage with a 
manufacturing cost of 50 dollars per unit as compared to 
firm I 's manufacturing cost of 100 do liars per unit. When 
p,
1
, = 2, on the other hand firm 2 has a manufacturing cost 
of 200 dollars per unit. Thus the right side of the figure 
( p~11 > 1) is when fum 1 has the manufacturing cost 
advantage while the left ( p~1t < 1) is when firm 2 has the 
manufacturing cost advantage. At PMt = 1 the manufacturing 
costs are the same and reliabilities are the same. For short 
hand we will say that on the right, firm 1 has a 
manufacturing cost advantage or simply a cost advantage; on 
the left, firm 2 has the cost advantage. 
The first result of the paper is that the firm with the 
manufacturing cost advantage will produce a higher quality 
product. Noticing that the R
1 
curve is concave up (barely) 
and the R 
2 
concave down, a change in the marginal cost ratio 
has a "more than linear" effect on the two reliabilities. 
1.4 1.6 1.8 20 rMc 
From the numerical example above notice that on the right 
side of PMc = 1 the average of the two manufacturing costs is 
above fi rm l 's, while on the left it is below. Algebraically, 
thjs is 
86 
me; +m~ (1+ Pw:) 
2 me, 2 {
>me,. PMc > 1 
<me; , PMt <l 
When the average is ·'rugh" (the right hand side of the 
figure) an increase firm 1 's manufacturing cost advantage 
(i.e., an increase in the marginal cost ratio) causes the two 
reliabilities to diverge more than they would if tbe curves 
were Linear. When the average is "low" (on the left) an 
increase in firm 2's manufacturing cost advantage (a 
decrease in the marginal cost ratio) causes the reliabilities to 
also diverge, but less than they would if the curves were 
linear. 
The results reported in Figure L will be called the "base .. 
case. The next three figures arc also comparative static 
experiments. They explore tbe effect on reliability of 
changing the marginal cost ratio and one other parameter. In 
the figures that follow the base case is the solid line; the 
effect of the change in the parameter of interest is shown by 
a dashed line. 
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FIGURE2 





0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 
Figure 2 shows the effects of a reduction in the value 
that customers place on the product. Specifically, while in 
the base case the range of reservation prices was from 
W=lOO to V=200 dollars. in the "low" case ofFigure 2 the 
~~--~------~~~~?_~0 rMc 
1.4 1.6 1.8 
range is from W=50 to V=150 dollars. These results suggest 
that as customers value the product less firms respond by 
producing a less reliable product. 
FIGURE3 
Reliabilities as a Function of the Marginal Cost Ratio: Customer Cost of Failure 
Reliability 
1.00 
Figure 3 shows the effect of a reduction in the customer 
cost of product failure from K=I 00 dollars in the base case 
to K=50 dollars. Generally, as customers are less damaged 
by product failure firms respond by producing a lower 
quality product. But notice the anomaly of the reliability of 
87 
firm 2 when its manufacturing costs are quite high. (The Rz 
curves actually intersect.) Future work might further 
investigate this result. 
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FIGURE4 





The interpretation of Figure 4 is slightly tricky. The 
question is: what happens if the marginal manufacturing 
costs change? The base case (solid lines) is as explained 
above. The dashed lines change the marginal manufacturing 
cost of fim1 1 to 50 dollars. Thus for example, when 
PwC" = .5 in the base case n!(; = 100 and mc
2 
=SO. For the 
dashed lines, at the same P.llc = .5 now me; =50 and mc
2 
= 25. 
For all marginal cost ratios, lower overall manufacturing 
costs (dashed lines) lead to a smaller difference in 
reliabilities between firms reliabilities as compared to the 
base case. Further, considering tile marginal cost ratios 
"near'' PMr = 1 both firm's reliabilities are higher than in the 
base case. As long as the f~rms' manufactming costs are 
"similar" (i.e., p .,1) lower overall costs lead to higher 
MC 
reliabilities. But when the marginal cost ratios are "farther'' 
from p - 1 the firm with the cost advantage has a higher '" -
reliability with the lower absolute costs. For example, on 
the far right where firm 1 has a larger cost advantage the 
reliability when its costs are low (the dashed line) is actually 
lower than for the base case. While on the far right dashed 
line for firm 2 is higher than the solid line of the base case. 
So when finns· manufactW'ing costs are very dissimilar, a 
reduction in its own marginal cost (dashed line compared to 
solid on the far right) leads the firm with the cost advantage 
to optimally produce a less reliable product. ln summary, a 
reduction in a given firm's manufacturing cost only causes it 
to produce a more reliable product when the difference in 
costs between fums is low. When the difference in costs is 
high a firm with a manufacturing cost advantage will use a 
reduc6on in its marginal cost as the occasion to actually 
produce a Jess reliable product. 
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CONCLUSION 
The theoretical exercise of the present paper considers 
the effects ofmanufaeturing cost advantage on a ftrm 's 
R&D expenditures, or equivalently in our model, on the 
quality of the product. The predictions of our analysis are 
sometimes straightforward. The firm with the 
manufacturing cost advantage will produce the more reliable 
product. But some of the predictions of the model are not so 
simple. It is not necessarily the case that a reduction in a 
given finn's manufacturing cost will cause it to produce a 
higher quality product. There is a sense in which a profit 
maximizing firm sometimes will take advantage of a 
reduction in its own manufacturing cost by actually doing 
less R&D- and thus producing a lower quality product. 
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